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Physical Layer Secret Key Generation
in Static Environments
Nasser Aldaghri, Student Member, IEEE, and Hessam Mahdavifar, Member, IEEE
Abstract—We consider the problem of symmetric secret key
generation in quasi-static/static environments, where the amount
of common randomness obtained from the characteristics of the
physical layer channel is limited. In order to provide a high-rate
secret key generation mechanism, we introduce a method called
induced randomness. In this method, locally generated ran-
domness is assumed at the legitimate parties. Such randomness
together with the uniqueness provided by the wireless channel
coefficients are utilized to enable high-rate secret key genera-
tion. We describe the proposed secret key generation protocol for
two scenarios; for the case where the legitimate parties have a
direct link (the first scenario), and for the case where the legiti-
mate parties do not have a direct link and communicate through
an untrusted relay (the second scenario). After the exchange of
the induced randomness, highly correlated samples are gener-
ated by the legitimate parties. These samples are then quantized,
reconciled, and hashed to compensate for the information leak-
age to the eavesdropper and to allow verification of consistency
of the generated key bit sequences. We utilize semantic security
measures and information-theoretic inequalities to upper bound
the probability of successful eavesdropping attack in terms of
the mutual information measures that can be numerically com-
puted. Given certain reasonable system parameters this bound
is numerically evaluated to be 2−31 and 2−11.3 in the first and
the second scenario, respectively. Furthermore, in the considered
numerical setup, the bit generation rate is 64 bits/packet, the bit
error rate is 0.002% and 0.0029% in the first and the second sce-
nario, respectively, and the eavesdropper’s average bit error rate
in both scenarios is almost 50%. The probability of accepting a
mismatched key by legitimate parties is also upper bounded us-
ing properties of hash functions and is evaluated in the numerical
setup to be 0.0015% for both scenarios.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless networks are becoming increasingly distributed in
future systems, e.g., the fifth generation of wireless networks
(5G) and the Internet of Things (IoT), which, consequently,
poses a higher risk of malicious attacks against message
confidentiality in these systems. In general, communica-
tion devices secure messages using either symmetric-key
encryption schemes such as Advanced Encryption Stan-
dard (AES) [2], or asymmetric-key encryption schemes, e.g.,
Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) [3]. Asymmetric-key schemes
are not preferred for devices with limited resources, e.g., as
in IoT networks, due to their complex mathematical oper-
ations. Instead, symmetric-key schemes are desired in IoT
networks due to their low-complexity implementations [4].
Such schemes require the same keys for the encryption and
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decryption to be distributed beforehand between the legiti-
mate parties. To complement the symmetric-key cryptographic
schemes, physical layer security methods can be deployed to
exchange secret keys between the nodes in order to be used in
the encryption and the decryption algorithms [5].
The fundamentalworks of [6], [7] established an information-
theoretic framework to study the use of common randomness
for secret key generation. In practice, characteristics of wire-
less links are shown to provide a great source for the common
randomness to be used in secret key generation, which have re-
cently received significant attention [8], [9]. More specifically,
the wireless channel has two main features that are essential
for secret key generation, namely, reciprocity and randomness.
The wireless channel is reciprocal over each single coherence
time [10], and it has inherent randomness due to the varia-
tion of the channel coefficients between different coherence
time slots [8]. Note that the former requires an underlying syn-
chronization mechanism while the latter assumes a dynamic
environment. These features are often assumed to be available
to the wireless nodes as legitimate parties which can be then
utilized in low-complexity secret key generation protocols at
the physical layer. Such protocols often include the following
steps [9]:
1) Randomness sharing: In this step, two legitimate parties,
also referred to as Alice and Bob, observe correlated sam-
ples from a common source of randomness, e.g., wireless
channel coefficients.
2) Quantization: This is the process of converting such corre-
lated samples, which are often real-valued, into informa-
tion bits.
3) Reconciliation: In general, there is a mismatch between
the binary sequences observed and quantized by Alice
and Bob. Reconciliation is the process of mitigating such
mismatch between Alice’s and Bob’s bit sequences using
methods such as cosets of binary linear codes.
4) Privacy amplification: This is the process of compensat-
ing for the information leakage to the eavesdropper, also
referred to as Eve, during the aforementioned steps.
A. Related Work
In this section, we provide an overview of related work on
secret key generation using characteristics of wireless channel
under two main scenarios; the first scenario where the legiti-
mate parties Alice and Bob have a direct communication chan-
nel as the only means of communication, and the second sce-
nario where their communication is helped by a relay node.
1) Secret key generation over direct communication chan-
nel: In this case, different characteristics of the wireless
2channel can be utilized as the source of common randomness
in secret key generation protocols. This includes the channel
state information (CSI), the received signal strength (RSS),
and the channel phase, just to name a few [11]. As mentioned
earlier, there are two main underlying assumptions in such
protocols. First, the assumption on reciprocity of the wireless
channel guarantees the reliability of such protocols. Second,
the randomness of the key is guaranteed by the assumptions on
temporal decorrelation [12]. The resulting secret key genera-
tion protocols, e.g., [8], [10], [13]–[16], often require dynamic
environments in order to satisfy the second assumption and
to enable secret key generation at non-zero rates. Wireless
channels can be naturally assumed to be dynamic assuming
a certain level of mobility by users and/or in the surround-
ing environment. However, such assumptions do not hold
in quasi-static/static environments such as indoor IoT net-
works. Consequently, the aforementioned protocols result in
ultra-low/zero secret key rates in such environments. This is-
sue has been studied in the literature and various solutions have
been proposed. This includes utilizing multiple-input-multiple-
output (MIMO) antennas systems [17], [18], beamforming
[19], deploying friendly jamming [20] where the users act
as jammers to confuse the eavesdropper, and using artificial
noise to confuse the eavesdropper [21], [22]. However, such
solutions often require complex underlying architectures, e.g.,
MIMO transceivers and unconstrained source of randomness,
which are expensive to implement [23]. This, in turn, makes
them unappealing for applications where nodes experience a
static environment and have limited resources, e.g., IoT net-
works, sensor networks, etc. Also, solutions based on utilizing
coupled dynamics existing in synchronization mechanisms
[24], [25] and based on full-duplex communications [26] are
proposed for low-complexity IoT networks, which are often
limited to very short range communications.
2) Secret key generation with the help of a relay: In this
case, there exists a relay node that assists Alice and Bob to
generate the shared secret keys. The wireless characteristics
used for the randomness sharing in the first scenario, e.g., CSI
and RSSI, can be similarly applicable here. Various methods
have been proposed in the literature to utilize relays in or-
der to improve the key generation rate when Alice and Bob
have a direct communication link as well [27], [28]. The use
of relays in generating secret keys when Alice and Bob do not
have a direct link is studied in [29]–[31]. A major arguable
assumption in these related works is that the relay nodes are
trusted. However, the wireless nodes, especially when they are
considered low complex and low cost as in IoT networks, are
susceptible to hacking, even after the key generation process
is done. Hence, it is highly desirable to ensure that limited in-
formation about the generated secret key is leaked to the relay
throughout the process. This is the motivation behind sev-
eral other related works which assumed the relay nodes are
untrusted. For instance, a method to accommodate this case
by utilizing friendly jamming is introduced in [32]. Another
method that requires a moving relay to generate secret bits is
proposed in [33]. Also, a novel method to resolve the issue
of untrusted relays using a MIMO architecture is suggested
in [34]. Such methods, however, require dynamic environ-
ments. As mentioned before, these protocols are not appealing
for applications where nodes are resource-constrained and the
environment is static.
B. Our Contributions
Our main contribution in this work is a solution, based on
low-complexity methods, for resolving the issue of low/zero
rate secret key generation between two legitimate nodes in
quasi-static/static environments. In the proposed solution, we
utilize induced randomness generated by the legitimate par-
ties and then exchanged between them. More specifically,
Alice and Bob independently generate a certain number of ran-
dom bits. Then, they map these bits to quadrature amplitude
modulation (QAM) symbols which they exchange using the
direct communication channel (the first considered scenario)
or through an untrusted relay (the second considered scenario).
After the exchange of the generated randomness, Alice and
Bob multiply their received sequences, which are the gener-
ated randomness by the other party and passed through the
channel, by their own random sequences. The reciprocity of
the channel/channels ensures that they obtain highly correlated
sequences. Such common noisy randomness can be then used
to extract shared secret keys by following quantization, recon-
ciliation, and privacy amplification steps. The reliability and
the security of the proposed protocols are analyzed by upper
bounding the probability of falsely accepting a mismatched
secret key and the probability of a successful eavesdropping
attack by Eve, respectively. While most of prior works on de-
signing physical layer secret key generation protocols rely on
spatial decorrelation assumptions to guarantees the security
of the key, we provide, to the best of our knowledge, the first
rigorous result on upper bounding the probability of success-
ful eavesdropping attack in such protocols. It is worth noting
that although the motivation behind the design of the proposed
protocols is to resolve the issue of environment immobility,
they work in dynamic environments as well assuming that
the wireless channel does not change during each session of
randomness exchanges.
The proposed protocols are considered under two major sce-
narios. In the first scenario, secret key generation over a direct
communication channel is considered. In the second scenario,
secret key generation with the help of an untrusted relay is
considered assuming that there is no direct communication
link between Alice and Bob. In the proposed protocols, a com-
munication scheme based on orthogonal frequency division
multiplexing (OFDM) is assumed to increase the secret key
rate. Furthermore, we utilize secure sketch [35] and universal
hash functions (UHF) [36] to ensure reliability and security of
the generated keys while enhancing the randomness of the key
bit sequences. Numerical results are provided for the proposed
protocol assuming reasonable parameters in the communica-
tion setup. These parameters include the modulation order,
the number of OFDM subcarriers, the signal-to-noise (SNR)
ratio, and the quantization resolution. Then various fundamen-
tal metrics are characterized including the bit generation rate
(BGR), the bit mismatch rate (BMR), the bit error rate (BER),
and the randomness of the key generated using the National
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Figure 1. System model for direct secret key generation.
Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) randomness tests
[37]. Furthermore, we introduce a new efficiency measure for
protocols that utilize induced randomness. This parameter,
called randomness efficiency, measures what percentage of the
induced randomness is utilized in the generated common ran-
dom sequence. The randomness efficiency in the first scenario
is 50%, while it is 33% in the second scenario.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The system
model of the two considered scenarios are discussed in Section
II. In Section III the proposed protocols for generating secret
keys are discussed. In Section IV the security of the proposed
protocols is analyzed. Numerical results are provided in Sec-
tion V. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Direct Secret Key Generation
The channel between Alice and Bob is assumed to be
an authenticated wireless channel, but it is not secure. The
eavesdropper, referred to as Eve, is assumed to be a passive
eavesdropper. The setup of the considered secret key genera-
tion (SKG) system is shown in Figure 1. The wireless channel
considered in this work is assumed to be a fading channel.
Suppose that Alice transmits a signal xAlice(t) to Bob, and he
receives
yBob(t) = xAlice(t)⊛ hab(t) + nb(t), (1)
where t denote the time, ⊛ denote the convolution operator,
hab(t) denote the circularly-symmetric Gaussian-distributed
channel response with mean 0 and variance σ2h/2 in each
dimension, and nb(t) denote the circularly-symmetric
Gaussian-distributed additive noise component with mean 0
and variance σ2n/2 in each dimension. In the case of flat fading
channels, the convolution converts to multiplication and the
channel response becomes the Rayleigh-distributed fading gain
coefficient with parameter σ, i.e., |hab| ∼ Rayleigh(σ), and
the phase is uniformly distributed, i.e., φ(hab) ∼ U [−pi, pi].
The same applies when Bob transmits xBob(t) to Alice, and
she receives
yAlice(t) = xBob(t)⊛ h˜ab(t) + na(t). (2)
Wireless channels are essentially reciprocal [38], meaning
that the CSI observed at Bob’s end from Alice is the same as
Alice’s end from Bob assuming an underlying synchronization
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Figure 2. System model for relay-based secret key generation.
mechanism. The reciprocity property, i.e., hab ≈ h˜ab, is the
key to most of the secret key generation protocols that utilize
characteristics of the physical layer channel. Also, Alice and
Bob are assumed to use OFDM. Suppose that Alice and Bob
transmit the j-th elements of the vectors xAlice(t) and xBob(t),
respectively, over the j-th OFDM subcarrier,. The received sig-
nals can be then expressed as follows:
yAlice(t) = xBob(t) ◦ h˜ab(t) + na(t), (3)
yBob(t) = xAlice(t) ◦ hab(t) + nb(t), (4)
where ◦ denote the Hadamard product, i.e., the element-wise
product. By using the received signals at Alice and Bob to-
gether with the uniqueness of wireless channel coefficients be-
tween them they aim at extracting a shared secret key. Note that
in addition to the wireless channel, Alice and Bob are assumed
to share a noiseless public channel that Eve has access to. This
channel can be realized by using the off-the-shelf modulation
and channel coding schemes.
B. Secret Key Generation Using a Relay
In this case, Alice and Bob do not have access to a direct
wireless channel. Instead, there is an intermediate party, also re-
ferred to as Carol, operating as a relay node with whom Alice
and Bob share authenticated wireless channels which are not
secure. The relay is considered to be amplify-and-forward and
is assumed to be compliant with the protocol, i.e., it amplifies
and forwards the signals without tampering with their contents.
However, the relay is considered to be untrusted. This is be-
cause it might be susceptible to hacking attacks by an adversary
or might be simply curious to learn the contents communicated
between Alice and Bob. The eavesdropper Eve is considered to
be a passive eavesdropper. The system model is shown in Fig-
ure 2. Similar to the model discussed in Section II-A, the chan-
nel between each two entities is modeled as a wireless fading
channel. Alice, Bob, and Carol utilize OFDM in their transmis-
sions. Alice wishes to transmit a signal xAlice(t) to Bob through
the relay Carol. First, Alice transmit xAlice(t) to Carol, and she
receives
yCarol(t) = xAlice(t) ◦ h(t) + nr(t). (5)
4The relay then amplifies the signal using amplification factor α
and transmits the amplified signal to Bob, and he receives
yBob(t)=α◦yCarol(t)◦ g˜(t) + nb(t) (6)
=α◦(xAlice(t) ◦ h(t) + nr(t))◦g˜(t) + nb(t), (7)
which holds due to the use of OFDM in transmissions between
Alice, Carol, and Bob. The same applies when Bob transmits
xBob(t) to Alice through Carol, where Alice receives
yAlice(t)=α◦(xBob(t) ◦ g(t) + nr(t))◦h˜(t) + na(t), (8)
where the j-th elements of the vectors h(t), h˜(t), g(t), g˜(t),
nr(t), na(t), and nb(t) are independent and circularly symmet-
ric Gaussian distributed with mean 0 and dimension-variance
of σ2h/2, σ
2
h/2, σ
2
g/2, σ
2
g/2, σ
2
nR
/2, σ2nA/2, and σ
2
nB
/2, re-
spectively.
The reciprocity property of the channels still holds in this
scenario. Alice and Bob use their received signals and utilize
the uniqueness of the wireless channel coefficients between
them and Carol to extract a secret key. As in the direct secret
key generation scenario, we have a noiseless public channel
between Alice and Bob through Carol which Eve has access to.
Such a channel can be realized by using the off-the-shelf mod-
ulation and coding schemes from Alice to Carol, from Carol to
Bob, and vice versa.
C. Evaluation Metrics for SKG Protocols
Metrics that are often used to evaluate the performance of
secret key generation protocols are as follows [14]:
1) Bit Generation Rate (BGR): This measures the number of
bits per packet in the quantized sequences generated by
Alice and Bob, denoted by qi,a and qi,b, respectively.
2) Bit Mismatch Rate (BMR): This measures the ratio of the
number of bits that are mismatched between qi,a and qi,b.
This quantity can be also measured at Eve’s side. Note
that the BMR at Eve should be higher than the BMR mea-
sured between Alice and Bob; otherwise, it is not possible
to generate a secret key.
3) Bit Error Rate (BER): This measures the ratio of the num-
ber of bits that do not match in the final key generated by
Alice and Bob as the output of the protocol. This quantity
can be also measured at Eve’s side, which, ideally, should
be close to 50%.
4) Randomness: This indicates whether the final key bit se-
quence generated by the protocol, denoted byKi,ab, is dis-
tinguishable from a random binary bit sequence. This is
often tested using the NIST randomness test suite [37].
In addition to the aforementionedmetrics we introduce a new
parameter, referred to as randomness efficiency, to measure the
length of the shared sequence normalized by the total amount
of randomness available to Alice and Bob. Let RQ denote the
total number of shared random bits after quantization. The ran-
domness efficiency, denoted by ER, is defined as
ER
def
=
RQ
H(S) +H(V )
, (9)
where H(S) and H(V ) are the entropy of Alice’s and Bob’s
sources of randomness, respectively.
Table I
NOTATION SUMMARY FOR i-TH SESSION
Symbol Description
p Known probing vector
si Alice’s local randomness
vi Bob’s local randomness
hi,ab Channel coefficients from Alice and Bob
h˜i,ab Channel coefficients from Bob to Alice
hi Channel coefficients between Alice and the relay
h˜i Channel coefficients between the relay and Alice
gi Channel coefficients between Bob and the relay
g˜i Channel coefficients between the relay and Bob
hi,ae Channel coefficients between Alice and Eve
hi,be Channel coefficients between Bob and Eve
wi,ab Alice’s samples used for quantization
w˜i,ab Bob’s samples used for quantization
qi,a Alice’s quantized version of wi,ab
qi,b Bob’s quantized version of w˜i,ab
Ki,ab Alice’s key bits
K˜i,ab Bob’s key bits
Ci,ab Alice’s check sequence bits
C˜i,ab Bob’s check sequence bits
III. PROPOSED PROTOCOLS
The proposed protocols for both scenarios, i.e., secret key
generation using a direct channel and relay-based secret key
generation, can be partitioned into four stages: induced ran-
domness exchange, quantization, reconciliation, and privacy
amplification together with consistency checking. The first
stage, i.e., exchanging induced randomness, is done differently
in the two considered scenarios, while the remaining stages are
similar.
In the first stage, the randomness is induced by Alice and
Bob at each of the N OFDM subcarriers, provided that each
two-way exchange is done within the same coherence time in-
terval. After the exchange of induced randomness, Alice and
Bob process what they receive: they perform quantization fol-
lowed by reconciliation to recover from the disparities between
their bit sequences. As a result, they obtain, with high prob-
ability, identical bit strings. Then they use privacy amplifica-
tion to improve the security of the generated streams. Finally,
they check whether their keys are consistent or not. If the keys
are not consistent, they re-initiate a new session. The notations
for various vectors in the protocol are summarized in Table I.
Also, Figure 3 shows an overview of a single session of key
generation protocol for the secret key generation scenario us-
ing a direct channel, and Figure 4 shows a single session of
the relay-based secret key generation protocol. For ease of no-
tation, we remove the time index t from the functions while
keeping in mind that the exchanges are done within the same
coherence time. Next, detailed descriptions of various stages of
the proposed protocols are provided.
A. Induced Randomness Exchange
In this stage we aim at creating highly correlated yet random
observations at Alice and Bob. We discuss this stage separately
for the two considered scenarios as follows:
1) Direct Induced Randomness Exchange: In this stage, Al-
ice and Bob exchange randomly generated symbols with each
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Figure 3. Direct secret key generation protocol overview of a single session.
other. In the i-th session, Alice chooses a vector si of lengthN
and Bob also chooses a vector vi of length N . Each element
of the vectors si and vi is chosen independently and uniformly
at random from a set of M symbols in a M -QAM constella-
tion. Then the symbols are multiplied by a pulse/carrier signal
for transmission. The reason behind choosing the symbols from
M -QAM constellation is that the hardware for transmitting and
receiving QAM symbols is readily available in many wireless
devices. After the exchange of random symbols, Alice and Bob
multiply what they sent with what they received. This results in
random sequences wi,ab and w˜i,ab available at Alice and Bob,
respectively, as follows:
wi,ab = si ◦ vi ◦ h˜i,ab + si ◦ ni,a, (10)
w˜i,ab = si ◦ vi ◦ hi,ab + vi ◦ ni,b. (11)
These two vectors are random and highly correlated, as will be
shown, which makes them suitable for extracting shared secret
keys between Alice and Bob.
2) Relay-Based Induced Randomness Exchange: First, the
relay used in the key generation process transmits a known
probing vector p to Alice and Bob, who receive yi,1,a and
yi,1,b, respectively, as follows:
yi,1,a = p ◦ h˜i + ni,1,a, (12)
yi,1,b = p ◦ g˜i + ni,1,b. (13)
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Figure 4. Relay-based secret key generation protocol overview of a single ses-
sion.
Alice and Bob then estimate the channel between themselves
and the relay, i.e., h˜i and g˜i, respectively, using their observa-
tions. Their estimates are denoted by ĥi and ĝi with estimation
errors defined as zi,a = (hi◦h˜i−ĥ
◦2
i ) and zi,b = (gi◦g˜i−ĝ
◦2
i ),
respectively, where (.)◦2 denote the element-wise square opera-
tion. Then, Alice and Bob choose independently and uniformly
at random vectors of lengthN consisting ofM -QAM symbols.
Let si and vi denote their vectors, respectively. They use the
probing signal p also for synchronization, and simultaneously
transmit their vectors to the relay in such a way that the SNR
at the relay with respect to the received sequences from Alice
and Bob are the same, and equal to a predetermined value. The
relay receives
yi,2,r = si ◦ hi + vi ◦ gi + ni,2,r. (14)
Then it amplifies yi,2,r with amplification factor α and for-
wards the amplified signal to Alice and Bob who receive yi,3,a
and yi,3,b, respectively, as follows:
yi,3,a = α(si ◦ hi + vi ◦ gi + ni,2,r) ◦ h˜i + ni,3,a, (15)
yi,3,b = α(si ◦ hi + vi ◦ gi + ni,2,r) ◦ g˜i + ni,3,b. (16)
6Figure 5. Sorting wi,ab values before feeding them to the quantizer.
The value of the amplification factor α is assumed to be pub-
licly known. Simplifying (15) and (16) yields
yi,3,a = αvi ◦ gi ◦ h˜i + αsi ◦ hi ◦ h˜i + αni,2,r ◦ h˜i + ni,3,a,
(17)
yi,3,b = αsi ◦ g˜i ◦ hi + αvi ◦ gi ◦ g˜i + αni,2,r ◦ g˜i + ni,3,b.
(18)
Alice and Bob utilize what they receive from the relay to-
gether with their locally generated vectors, the channel estima-
tions, and α in order to construct highly correlated samples.
More specifically, the self-interference terms αsi ◦ hi ◦ h˜i and
αvi ◦ gi ◦ g˜i are cancelled, the results are normalized by α and
then multiplied by the local randomness, which results in wi,ab
and w˜i,ab at Alice and Bob, respectively, as follows:
wi,ab = si ◦ vi ◦ gi ◦ h˜i + n̂i,3,a, (19)
w˜i,ab = si ◦ vi ◦ g˜i ◦ hi + n̂i,3,b, (20)
where
n̂i,3,a = s
◦2
i ◦ zi,a + si ◦ ni,2,r ◦ h˜i + si ◦ ni,3,a/α, (21)
n̂i,3,b = v
◦2
i ◦ zi,b + vi ◦ ni,2,r ◦ g˜i + vi ◦ ni,3,b/α, (22)
are the noise terms. The two vectors wi,ab and w˜i,ab observed
by Alice and Bob are highly correlated and random, which
makes them suitable for extracting secret keys.
B. Quantization
In this stage, the complex-valued shared sequenceswi,ab and
w˜i,ab are turned into bit streams. We use a similar quantization
method as suggested in [13]. A brief description of this quan-
tization scheme is included next. After collecting the complex-
valued measurements wi,ab and w˜i,ab they are sorted as shown
in Figure 5. Then Alice and Bob find the range of sorted data,
which is defined as range(wi,ab) = max(wi,ab)−min(wi,ab)
at Alice and range(w˜i,ab) = max(w˜i,ab)−min(w˜i,ab) at Bob.
Then they find the quantization resolution δ, use it to compute
the number of uniform intervals ∆ = 2δ, and assign a Gray-
code sequence to each interval. Finally, they map each sample
to its quantized bit sequence based on the interval it belongs to.
The resulting bit sequences for Alice and Bob are denoted as
qi,a and qi,b, respectively.
C. Reconciliation
The aim of this stage is to mitigate disagreements between
Alice’s and Bob’s bit strings after quantization. To this end,
variousmethods, such as error-correcting codes, can be used. In
our protocols we use secure sketch [35], while picking a convo-
lutional code as the underlying code. The reason to pick convo-
lutional codes is due to the simplicity of the encoding process
using shift registers and the decoding process using Viterbi de-
coder [39]. The encoder is chosen in such a way that the length
of its output is equal to the length of qi,a. Once the quantized
strings qi,a and qi,b are available, Alice chooses a bit string r
uniformly at random and encodes it using the convolutional en-
coder to get Enc(r), which is of the same length as qi,a. Then
she computes
SS = qi,a ⊕ Enc(r), (23)
and transmits this over the noiseless public channel, either di-
rectly as in the first scenario or through the relay as in the sec-
ond scenario, to Bob. Then, Bob takes the XOR of SS and qi,b,
feeds it to the Viterbi decoder to get r˜, and re-encodes r˜ to get
Enc(˜r). Bob gets the final string as
q˜i,a = SS⊕ Enc(Dec(SS⊕ qi,b))
= SS⊕ Enc(˜r). (24)
Remark: The error correction capability of the convolutional
code depends on the underlying rate of the code. This rate is se-
lected according to channel conditions when implementing the
protocol and can be adopted accordingly if channel conditions
change.
D. Privacy Amplification Consistency Checking
Since some information about the shared key is leaked to Eve
during the exchange of random symbols, we exploit universal
hash functions (UHF) to increase the level of security. In gen-
eral, UHFs are desired in such scenarios due to their resilience
against collisions.
Definition 1: [36] A family of hash functionsH that maps a
set of inputs U , e.g., binary vectors of length n, to a value in
the hash table of size t is called universal if for any two inputs
x, y ∈ U with x 6= y, we have
Pr
h←H
(h(x) = h(y)|x 6= y) 6
1
t
. (25)
We also use UHFs to check consistency between keys gener-
ated by Alice and Bob, without leaking any information to Eve,
as suggested in [15].
Given that h should be chosen randomly from H , the ques-
tion is how do we ensure that Alice and Bob agree on the same
h? We propose a method that guarantees the same choice of h
at Alice and Bob if inputs to the UHF are consistent. Suppose
we have a random binary string qi of length n (This is qi,a
for Alice and q˜i,a for Bob). For simplicity we assume that n is
an even multiple of m. We divide qi into two strings of equal
length qi = qi,1‖qi,2. Then qi,1 is used to choose h from H ,
and qi,2 is used as the input to the hash function h. Next, a well-
known construction of UHF is described that we use in our pro-
tocol [36]. First, the largest prime p ofm bits, i.e. 2m−1 < p <
2m, is chosen wherem is the length of the output bit sequence
(such primes always exist by Bertrand’s postulate). Then for
i = 1, 2, we divide qi,1 and qi,2 into l parts qi,1,k and qi,2,k
for k = 1, 2, . . . , l, where the length of each part is less than or
equal tom. For ease of notation, let qi,j,k also denote the num-
ber with the binary representation qi,j,k . Finally, we evaluate
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hqi,1(qi,2) =
l∑
k=1
qi,1,kqi,2,k mod p. (26)
Note that in our protocol, qi is random, and will be differ-
ent at each session of the protocol due to the randomness of
si and vi. The output of this step are the keys Ki,ab for Alice
and K˜i,ab for Bob. Since we have done the reconciliation step,
the two keys will match with high probability. Note that the
probability of two keys not matching depends on the error cor-
rection capability of the underlying code in the secure sketch
step. It is very crucial that Alice and Bob verify whether their
keys match or not. To this end, they hash Ki,ab and K˜i,ab again
similar to the described process above by splitting them into
two parts and using the first part as the hash function to hash
the second part. Then they get check sequencesCi,ab and C˜i,ab
and confirm whether they match or not. It is worth noting that
the length of the check sequences, Ci,ab and C˜i,ab, is half the
length of the key.
Theorem 1: The probability of accepting a mismatched key
as consistent by the described protocol with hash table size p
for the check sequence is upper bounded as follows:
Pr(Ci,ab = C˜i,ab|Ki,ab 6= K˜i,ab) 6
1
p
(27)
Proof: This follows directly from the definition of univer-
sal hash functions, using equation (25) where the output hash
table size is p.
IV. ATTACKER MODEL AND THE RESILIENCE OF
PROPOSED PROTOCOLS
In this section we discuss eavesdropping strategies by Eve,
who is considered to be passive, in both scenarios, i.e., whether
the communication is through a direct communication channel
or through a relay, and upper bound the probability of a suc-
cessful eavesdropping attack.
A. Direct Secret Key Generation
In this scenario, Eve’s best strategy is to acquire si, vi and
hi,ab. When Alice and Bob exchange signals, Eve receives
ei,1 = si ◦ hi,ae + ne1 , (28)
ei,2 = vi ◦ hi,be + ne2 . (29)
Even if Eve is able to estimate both vi and si from her obser-
vations in (28) and (29) perfectly, she still needs to know hi,ab
at all different subcarriers in order to obtainwi,ab. Luckily, this
is, almost, not possible for Eve due to the spatial decorrelation
as discussed next. As shown in [12], the correlation coefficient
ρ of the channel fading coefficients at locations separated by
distance d is calculated as follows,
ρ = [J0(kd)]
2, (30)
where J0(.) is the Bessel function of first kind, and k is the
wavenumber. Therefore, if the distance between Alice/Bob and
Eve is larger than half of the wavelength λ/2, e.g., 5 cm in
3GHz band, they will experience almost uncorrelated fading
channels. Therefore, the leaked information about the gener-
ated secret key to Eve is small and is often assumed to be neg-
ligible in the literature. However, it is fundamentally important
to quantitatively measure the security level. An information-
theoretic measure of security is the mutual information between
the shared random sequence, from which the secure key will be
generated, and what Eve observes. If we assume that the effect
of quantization is negligible and also assume that Eve can per-
fectly recover vi and si, this mutual information is equal to the
mutual information between hi,ab and (hi,ae, hi,be). One can
assume that Eve is closer to Bob than Alice and hence, only
consider the mutual information between hi,ab and hi,ae as the
dominating term. This can be calculated in each subcarrier as
stated in the next lemma.
Lemma 2: Let hbk and hek denote the fading coefficients of
Bob’s and Eve’s channels at the k-th subcarrier. Also, let ρ de-
note the correlation coefficient between hbk and hek, as calcu-
lated in (30). Then the mutual information between hbk and hek
is given by
I(hbk;hek) = − log(1− ρ
2) bits (31)
Proof: We have hbk = hbk,I+jhbk,Q, and hek = hek,I+
jhek,Q. hbk,I , hbk,Q are independent and identically distributed
asN (0, σ2b/2) and hek,I , hek,Q are independent and identically
distributed asN (0, σ2e/2). The real parts of Bob’s and Eve’s are
correlated with ρ, and the imaginary parts are also correlated
random variables with ρ. Then we have the following covari-
ance matrices:
Σ1=
[
σ2b/2 0
0 σ2b/2
]
,Σ2=
[
σ2e/2 0
0 σ2e/2
]
, (32)
Σ3=


σ2b/2 0
ρσbσe
2
0
0 σ2b/2 0
ρσbσe
2
ρσbσe
2
0 σ2e/2 0
0 ρσbσe
2
0 σ2e/2

 . (33)
Then we have the following series of equalities:
I(hbk;hek) = I(hbk,I + jhbk,Q;hek,I + jhek,Q)
(a)
= I(hbk,I , hbk,Q;hek,I , hek,Q)
(b)
= Hd(hbk,I , hbk,Q) +Hd(hek,I , hek,Q)
−Hd(hbk,I , hbk,Q, hek,I , hek,Q)
(c)
=
1
2
log(det(2pieΣ1)) +
1
2
log(det(2pieΣ2))
−
1
2
log(det(2pieΣ3))
(d)
= log(pieσ2b ) + log(pieσ
2
e)
− log((pieσbσe)
2(1− ρ2))
(e)
= − log(1 − ρ2), (34)
where:
(a) holds due to having a one-to-one mapping;
(b) is the expansion of the mutual information expression in
terms of differential entropy;
(c) holds by using the well-known expression that the differen-
tial entropy of multivariate Gaussian random variables Xn =
8(X1 , X2 , ..., Xn) with covariance matrix Σi is Hd(X
n) =
1
2
log(det(2pieΣi));
and (d) and (e) are simplification steps.
Note that as ρ goes to zero the mutual information given by
Lemma2 also goes to zero.
The next question, which also applies to any physical layer
security scheme that utilizes information-theoretic measures of
security, is how to quantitatively characterize the chances of a
successful eavesdropping attack by Eve, i.e., guessing the key,
given the leaked information? The latter is often measured in
terms of semantic security, which is a classical notion of secu-
rity in cryptosystems [40]. Direct connections between metrics
for the information-theoretic security, based on the mutual in-
formation, and cryptographic measures of security, including
semantic security, are provided in [41]. We use these connec-
tions to arrive at the following theorem which characterizes the
security of our proposed protocol from the aforementioned per-
spective:
Theorem 3: Let N denote the number of subcarriers used in
the proposed protocol and δ denote the quantization resolution.
Then the probability of a successful eavesdropping attack by
Eve is upper bounded as follows:
Pr(Successful attack) <
(
2−2δ +
√
2I(hb;he)
)N
+ 2−δN ,
(35)
where hb and he denote the fading coefficients of Bob’s and
Eve’s channels at a subcarrier.
Proof: By [41, Theorem 5] the probability that Eve can
guess the shared random bits in a subcarrier, given her obser-
vations in this subcarrier, is increased by at most
√
2I(hb;he)
comparing to the case where she does not have any observa-
tion. Therefore, her chances of successfully guessing these
quantized bits is upper bounded by 2−2δ +
√
2I(hb;he). The
probability that Eve can recover the shared randomness over
all subcarriers is then given by
(
2−2δ +
√
2I(hb;he)
)N
. Note
that I(hb;he) is the same across all the subcarriers and is ac-
tually computed in terms of ρ in Lemma2. If Eve can not
recover all the shared randomness, the probability that she can
guess the secret key right, by the property of hash functions in
the privacy amplification part of our protocol, is at most 2−δN ,
when using a check sequence of half the key length. Utilizing
these together with a union bound completes the proof.
Note that Theorem3 together with Lemma2 can be used to
provide a numerical upper bound on the probability of success-
ful eavesdropping attack given a lower bound on the distance
between Eve and both Alice and Bob. For instance, suppose
that the distance between Eve and Bob is at least half of the
wavelength λ/2 and is less than the distance between Eve and
Alice. Then the correlation coefficient ρ is at most 0.09 and
by Lemma2 the resulting mutual information I(hb;he) is at
most 0.01 bits at any of the subcarriers. Suppose that N = 16
and δ = 2, which are also used in the numerical results pro-
vided in the next section. Then by Theorem3 the probability
of a successful attack by Eve given such parameters is at most
2−37 + 2−32 < 2−31.
B. Relay-based Secret Key Generation
In this scenario, Eve tries to use her observations and the
messages transmitted over the public channel to guess wi,ab
and/or w˜i,ab, as described by (19) and (20). Her best strategy
is to find si, vi, gi and hi. When Alice and Bob transmit their
induced randomness Eve receives
ei,1 = si ◦ hi,ae + vi ◦ gi,be + ni,e1 . (36)
Even if Eve can estimate si and vi perfectly, she does not get
more information from her observations since hi,ae, gi,be, hi,
and gi, are uncorrelated. However, when Carol, the relay, am-
plifies and forwards the signal it received Eve receives
ei,2 = α(si ◦ hi + vi ◦ gi + ne1) ◦ fi,ce + ni,e2 . (37)
Since Eve can estimate the channel coefficients fi,ce from the
relay’s transmission when it transmits the known probing sig-
nal, and she knows the value of α from the messages over the
public channel, she can successfully estimate
wi,e = si ◦ hi + vi ◦ gi + ni,e3 . (38)
To summarize the above discussion, Eve’s observation is a de-
graded version of the information available to Carol. Hence,
one can assume that, in a worst case scenario from the legiti-
mate parties’ perspective, Eve has as much information as the
relay has. Consequently, the problems of securing the shared
key against Eve and against the untrusted relay Carol coincide.
In the remaining of this section, we analyze the probability of a
successful eavesdropping attack assuming that the eavesdrop-
per has all the information available to Carol.
Note that the spatial decorrelation feature of the wireless
channels does not help in ensuring the security in this scenario
as it does in the first scenario with a direct communication
channel. Also, the mutual information between wi,ab, as de-
scribed in (19), and wi,e, as described in (38), is expected not
to be very small as it was in the first scenario. For instance,
if this mutual information is greater than 0.5, then using [41,
Theorem 5], same as how we used it in the proof of Theorem3,
does not yield a non-trivial upper bound on the probability of
successful eavesdropping attack. Hence, instead of utilizing
semantic security, we need to use an alternative approach to
relate I(wi,ab,wi,e) to the probability of successful eavesdrop-
ping attack. To this end, we use Fano’s inequality to bound
the probability of successful estimation of the quantized bits
qi,a by the eavesdropper in terms of the conditional entropy
of the quantized bits qi,a given the eavesdropper’s observa-
tions wi,e. Note that the latter can be bounded in terms of
I(wi,ab,wi,e). The details of this analysis is given next in the
proof of Theorem4.
To simplify the expressions in the next theorem, let us con-
sider an arbitrary subcarrier and denote the corresponding en-
tries of the vectors wi,ab, wi,e, and qi,a as wab, we, and qa,
respectively. Note that the result of Theorem4 does not depend
on the choice of the subcarrier.
Theorem 4: Let N denote the number of subcarriers used in
the proposed protocol and δ denote the quantization resolution.
9Then the probability of a successful eavesdropping attack by
Eve is upper bounded as follows:
Pr(Successful attack) <
(
1−
H(qa)− Iab,e − 1
log2(|QA|)
)N
+ 2−δN , (39)
where Iab,e denote I(wab;we), QA denote the support of qa,
and |QA| denote its cardinality.
Proof: Let C denote the event of correct estimation of qa
and E denote the event of erroneous estimation of qa by the
eavesdropper. Then we have the following
Pr(C) = 1− Pr(E) (40)
(a)
6 1−
H(qa|we)− 1
log2(|QA|)
(41)
(b)
= 1−
H(qa)− I(qa;we)− 1
log2(|QA|)
(42)
(c)
6 1−
H(qa)− I(wab;we)− 1
log2(|QA|)
(43)
(d)
= 1−
H(qa)− Iab,e − 1
log2(|QA|)
, (44)
where:
(a) holds by Fano’s inequality [42];
(b) is the expansion of conditional entropy;
(c) follows from the data processing inequality because qa is a
deterministic function of wab and hence, we,wab, and qa form
a Markov chain;
(d) is change of the notation of I(wab;we) to Iab,e.
Note that the probability of correctly estimating every bit of
qa, denoted as Pr(CN), is equal to the probability of correctly
estimating qa over all N subcarriers, since the mutual infor-
mation is the same over all subcarriers. Hence, by using the
independence of such events across theN subcarriers, we have
Pr(CN) 6
(
1−
H(qa)− Iab,e − 1
log2(|QA|)
)N
. (45)
If Eve can not recover all the shared randomness bits in a sin-
gle session, the probability that she correctly guesses the secret
key, by the property of hash functions in the privacy amplifica-
tion part of our protocol, is at most 2−δN . This, together with
(45) and using the union bound complete the proof.
Next we illustrate how Theorem4 can be used in a numerical
setup to upper bound the probability of a successful eavesdrop-
ping attack by Eve. Suppose that Alice and Bob use 64-QAM
constellation points to transmit their induced randomness, the
received SNR is 23 dB at Alice and Bob, the quantization pa-
rameter δ is 2, and the number of subcarriers N is 16. Given
these parameters we numerically estimate the mutual informa-
tion Iab,e = I(wab;we) which results in Iab,e ≈ 1.31 bits, and
the numerical entropy of the generated key bits which results in
H(qa) ≈ 3.86 bits. Then by Theorem4 the probability of suc-
cessful eavesdropping attack is upper bounded, approximately,
by 2−11.3.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we consider a certain numerical setup with re-
alistic parameters and evaluate the proposed protocols for the
two described scenarios, i.e., with and without relay, using the
metrics described in Section II.
A. Direct Secret Key Generation
In this scenario, it is assumed that Alice and Bob communi-
cate over a direct and reciprocal wireless channel. The numer-
ical results are provided assuming a received SNR of 20 dB at
Alice, Bob, and Eve. Also, the constellation size is M = 16,
i.e., 16-QAM symbols are transmitted by both Alice and Bob.
Also, 16 OFDM subcarriers are assumed to be available in the
channel between Alice and Bob. The quantization is done with
δ = 2, i.e., the real and imaginary parts of the received symbol
in each subcarrier is quantized into one of the four possibilities
as discussed in Section III-B. Finally, the steps including se-
cure sketch, hashing, and consistency checking are performed
as discussed in Section III. Note that 16 × 2 × 2 = 64 bits
are generated by Alice and Bob during each session of the pro-
tocol and the length of the final secret key is 64/2 = 32 bits.
However, to increase the bit error rate at Eve, we assume that
four blocks of keys, generated during four separate sessions,
are XORed to obtain one key of length 32 per each four ses-
sions.
1) Bit Generation Rate (BGR): For quasi-static channels,
the rate of the common randomness generation, without ran-
domness induction, is often very low due to the constant
channel state information over an extended period of time.
This problem is resolved in our protocol using the randomness
induction. In the considered numerical setup using realistic pa-
rameters we get a rate of 64 bits/packet, as discussed above.
This is close to the result reported in [14] which proposed
SKG protocols for dynamic channels. In [14] secret rates of
60-90 bits/packet are obtained using 30 subcarriers. However,
we considered using only 16 subcarriers. The rate of our pro-
posed protocol can be potentially improved by using more
subcarriers and/or higher quantization resolution. Note that the
transmitted power, and consequently the SNR, needs to be also
increased accordingly in order to ensure reasonably low bit
mismatch rate.
2) Bit Mismatch Rate (BMR): The generated sequences by
Alice and Bob after the quantization are compared to determine
the bit mismatch rate. In the simulations, the bit mismatch rate
between Alice and Bob is 5%, while the bit mismatch rate be-
tween Alice and Eve is 28%.
3) Bit Error Rate (BER): The final generated keys at the end
of the protocol are tested. The bit error rate between Alice and
Bob is 0.002%. Also, as shown in Figure 6, the BER at Eve is
between 30% and 70%, with a high probability, and the average
bit error rate at Eve is approximately 50%.
4) Randomness: The randomness of the generated sequence
is examined using the NIST statistical test suite [37]. The suite
consists of 15 tests and generates a probability value, also re-
ferred to as p-value, for each individual test. For each test, a
sequence is considered randomwith 99% confidence if the cor-
responding p-value is greater than 0.01. We run the protocol to
generate a sequence of length 220 bits and feed it to the test
suite. Since the sequence passes all the tests as shown in Table
III, the sequence that was generated by the proposed protocol
is considered random with 99% confidence.
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5) Randomness Efficiency: This is computed according to
(9). Alice and Bob randomly choose a bit string of length 64
and therefore,H(S) = H(V ) = 64. Note that the length of the
bit string after reconciliation is 64, which is considered almost
uniformly at random due to the statistical test results shown
above. Therefore, we have RQ ≈ 64. This implies that ER ≈
50%. Roughly speaking, the other 50% of available random-
ness is used to provide security. The exact trade-off between
randomness efficiency and security is an interesting problem.
Remark: As discussed in Section IV-A, the probability of suc-
cessful attack by Eve is upper bounded by 2−31 with the given
system parameters and assuming Eve’s distance with both Al-
ice and Bob is at least λ/2. In the simulation results, we ob-
served that the probability of accepting a mismatched key is
0.0015%, which is less than 0.00153% as predicted by Theo-
rem1.
B. Relay-based Secret Key Generation
In this scenario it is assumed that Alice and Bob have di-
rect and reciprocal wireless channels with the relay, which can
be successfully estimated. Also, a worst-case scenario is con-
sidered for eavesdropping, as discussed in Section IV-B, where
Eve’s and the relay’s observations are the same. Alice and Bob
choose their induced randomness from the set of 64-QAM sym-
bols, and set their power levels in such a way that the received
SNRs at the relay from both Alice and Bob are equal. Then, the
amplification vector α is chosen such that the received SNR at
Alice and Bob is 23 dB. Also, similar to the first scenario, the
quantization parameter is δ = 2 bits per sample and every four
blocks are XORed to generate a final key.
1) Bit Generation Rate (BGR): The proposed protocol gen-
erates 64 bits/packet. This rate is similar to the rate of the di-
rect secret key generation protocol. This is due to the use of
the same number of subcarriers and the number of quantiza-
tion levels. Note that the constellation size is considered to be
different in this scenario but that does not affect BGR. Also, as
mentioned before, this rate can be improved by using more sub-
carriers and/or higher quantization resolutions at the expense of
increasing SNR.
2) Bit Mismatch Rate (BMR): Similar to the first scenario,
the generated sequences by Alice and Bob after the quanti-
zation are compared to determine the bit mismatch rate. The
resulting bit mismatch rate between Alice and Bob is 8.45%,
while the bit mismatch rate between Alice’s quantized se-
quence and Eve’s quantized sequence wi,e, described in (38),
is 45%.
3) Bit Error Rate (BER): The final generated keys at the end
of the protocol are tested. The bit error rate between Alice and
Bob is 0.0029%. As shown in Figure 6, the BER at Eve is be-
tween 30% and 70%, with a high probability, and the average
bit error rate at Eve is approximately 50%, which is similar to
the first scenario due to the use of the same hash functions.
4) Randomness: Similar to the first scenario, a key sequence
consisting of 220 bits is generated and is fed to the NIST statis-
tical test suite. The results are shown in table III. As the tests
indicate, the protocol successfully passes the randomness tests.
Table II
SUMMARY OF BMR AND BER FOR BOTH SCENARIOS
Scenario BMRAB BMRAE BERAB BERAE
DSKG 5% 28% 0.002% 50%
RSKG 8.45% 45% 0.0029% 50%
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Figure 6. The cumulative distribution function of the BER at Eve for direct,
and relay-based secret key generation.
5) Randomness Efficiency: Alice and Bob induce 96 ran-
dom bits during each round, resulting in H(S) = H(V ) = 96,
while the length of the quantized sequence isRQ = 64. The re-
sulting randomness efficiency of the proposed protocol is then
approximately 33%.
Remark: As discussed in Section IV-B, the probability of suc-
cessful attack by Eve is upper bounded by 2−11.3 for the pa-
rameters used above assuming a worst-case scenario that Eve’s
observation is the same as the relay’s observation. Also, we ob-
served that the probability of accepting a mismatched key is
0.0015%, which is less than 0.00153% as predicted by Theo-
rem1.
Table III
NIST STATISTICAL TEST RESULTS
Test Direct Relay
Monobit 0.5081 0.0688
Frequency Block 0.1356 0.7805
Runs 0.2536 0.6085
Longest Run of Ones 0.4750 0.5937
Binary Matrix Rank 0.8581 0.7614
DFT 0.9714 0.3071
Non-Overlapping Template Matching 1 1
Overlapping Template Matching 0.7625 0.7458
Maurer’s Universal Statistical 1 0.9986
Linear Complexity 0.5298 0.8719
Serial 0.5051 0.8483
Approximate Entropy 0.6340 0.8488
Cumulative Sums 0.6198 0.0145
Random Excursion 0.4350 0.1412
Random Excursion Variant Test 0.0359 0.0669
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Figure 7. The cumulative distribution function of the number of sessions until
key agreement.
C. Number of Sessions Required to Generate Keys
In this subsection, the average number of sessions Alice
and Bob need to generate their final secret key is compared.
Note that the length of final secret key is 32 and is obtained by
XORing the output of the protocol in four successful sessions.
For the first scenario with 20 dB SNR, the average number of
sessions is about 4.7 sessions, while in the second scenario
with 23 dB SNR it is around 9.34 sessions. This number being
higher in the second scenario is due to more severe effect of
the noise on the shared randomness. This, consequently, affects
how often Alice and Bob obtain the same key sequence result-
ing in a successful session of the protocol. Figure 7 shows the
cumulative distribution function of the number of sessions for
both scenarios.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a new approach to generate se-
cret keys in static environments at high rates using induced
randomness. We utilize a low-complexity method where le-
gitimate parties induce locally-generated randomness into the
channel such that high-rate common randomness can be gen-
erated. More specifically, two main scenarios are considered
for the proposed protocols taking into account whether a direct
wireless channel is available between legitimate parties or no
such channel is available and the transmissions occur through
an intermediate relay. We evaluate the reliability and security
of the proposed protocols using information theoretic mea-
sures. The protocols are also evaluated in a numerical setup
using metrics including BGR, BMR, BER, and the randomness
efficiency as a newly introduced measure. To ensure that the
keys generated by this protocol are random, we test the gener-
ated keys using the NIST statistical test suite. Furthermore, the
low-complexity nature of the various stages of the proposed
protocols make them appealing for applications concerning
resource-constrained devices, e.g., IoT networks, where low
complexity methods for generating distributed secret keys are
highly desirable.
There are several possible directions for future work. It is in-
teresting to extend the setups considered in this paper to multi-
user scenarios where multiple users wish to generate shared se-
cret keys with the help of multiple intermediate relays. From
an information-theoretic perspective, this relates to the prob-
lem of distributed secret sharing in multi-user scenarios [43].
Also, investigating scenarios where the passive eavesdropper
has further capabilities than what is considered in this paper,
e.g., being able to deploy multiple antennas in the surrounding
environment, is another interesting direction. Moreover, study-
ing the resilience of the proposed protocols in the presence of
an active eavesdropper who can act as a jammer with the aim
of crippling the key generation process by sending intentional
interference during the randomness exchange is another inter-
esting direction for future work.
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